GAO-NSIAD-99-82-B-282071
MILITARY SAFETY
Army M939 5-Ton Truck Accident History and Planned Modifications
APRIL 1999
GAO-NSIAD-99-82-B-282071 - Page 15 of 23
B-282071
Agency Comments
In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. III),
DOD
stated that
it concurred with this report and noted that the report accurately
describes problems the Army found to be causing M939 accidents.
Scope and
Methodology
To analyze the accident history of the M939 series 5-ton tactical vehicle,
we obtained specific information from the Army Safety Center, Fort
Rucker, Alabama;
TACOM
, Warren, Michigan; the Department of
Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C.; and
the Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.
To identify any accident anomalies associated with the M939s, we
conducted two analyses and reviewed another conducted by the Army
Safety Center. Our first analysis compared selected M939 accident
statistics with similar information for the overall Army motor vehicle fleet
(of which M939s are a subset). Our second analysis compared M939
accident statistics per million miles driven to Department of
Transportation accident statistics for comparable commercial trucks. The
Army Safety Center study we reviewed compared various M939 accident
frequency rates per million miles driven with rates for comparable military
tactical trucks.
The number of years used in each comparison varied on the basis of the
data available. Army motor vehicle fleet to M939 comparisons did not
include events prior to 1987 because some accident statistics were not
readily available. Our comparison of rates of M939 fatal accident events
and vehicle occupant fatalities with rates for corresponding commercial
sector trucks was limited to 1987-1996 due to the unavailability of accident
data for commercial sector vehicles after 1996. Lastly, the Army Safety
Center study comparing M939 Class A accident rates with rates for other
similar Army tactical vehicles only included events occurring between
October 1990 and June 1998. The extent to which other factors, such as
human error, driver training, and off-road versus on-road usage, may have
contributed to disparate accident rates was beyond the scope of this
review.
To assess Army initiatives directed at identifying M939 performance,
mechanical, or systemic problems and limitations, as well as
recommended corrective actions, we obtained or reviewed relevant Army
studies. We also interviewed officials at the Army Safety Center and
TACOM
about these studies but did not assess or validate the findings, estimated
costs, or recommendations resulting from these studies.
GAO/NSIAD-99-82 Military Safety
Page 14
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